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Protecting the Insured in Utah: Rethinking the 
"Interstitial" Approach of Allen v. Prudential Property & 
Casualty Insurance Co.* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Courts and commentators have frequently cited a long list of the spe-
cial risks shared by insured parties in today's insurance industry. Insurance 
form contracts are contracts of adhesion, prepared by the insurance com-
pany and offered to the insured on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, giving the 
insurer a special opportunity for "overreaching" in drafting the contract.' 
These contracts are typically lengthy, written in fine print, and difficult to 
understand, especially since established contract law mandates courts con-
strue policy language in light of the whole contract, regardless of the 
placement of policy provisions.2 It is well accepted that insured parties nei-
ther understand their insurance policies, nor are they reasonably expected 
to read them.3 Most only worry about the few terms that are actually nego-
tiated, such as the general coverage the policy purports to offer, the cost, 
and the policy limits.4 Notwithstanding these realities, the traditional law 
of contracts assumes the fiction that the insured has read the contract, un-
derstood it, and has assented to its terms.5 
To protect insured parties against the potential overreaching of insur-
ance companies in drafting insurance contracts, courts have long applied 
equitable doctrines, which may at times grant an insured party rights that 
are at variance with the policy provisions.6 The especially prevalent appli-
cation of equitable doctrines in insurance contract settings resulted in criti-
• Copyright © 1998 by Mark T. Flickinger. 
I. Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. 
L. REV. 961, 963, 966 (1970) 
2. See Nielsen v. O'Reilly, 848 P.2d 664, 666-67 (Utah 1992). 
3. See, e.g., Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance 
Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823, 838 (1990) (stating insurance fonn contracts are 
rarely read, and when read they are not sufficiently understood); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS, § 211 cmt. b (1979) (stating that in standardized agreements, generally the party using 
the fonn does not expect customers to "understand or even ... read the standardized tenns); see 
also Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective Theory of Consumer 
Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263, 1269-71 (1993). 
4. See Meyerson, supra note 3, at 1278 (noting that in consumer fonn contracts, there is no 
true "assent" to specific tenns in the contract except the "few dickered tenns, and the broad type 
of the transaction"). 
5. See id. at 1265. 
6. See Keeton, supra note I. 
389 
390 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 12 
cism that courts were straining some doctrines beyond their justifiable lim-
its to reach results in favor of insured persons.7 However, Professor (now 
United States District Judge) Robert E. Keeton, in a series of law review 
articles, argued there were "compelling currents of principle" among these 
seemingly deviant insurance law decisions. 8 One such principle advanced 
by Professor Keeton was that courts would honor the "objectively reason-
able expectations" of insured persons, even where these expectations were 
at variance with the policy provisions.9 
This early statement of what Professor Keeton recognized as an 
emerging principle has since evolved into a doctrine of law which a major-
ity of courts who have considered its adoption have accepted. 10 The Utah 
Supreme Court, however, rejected the application of the reasonable expec-
tations doctrine by a closely divided decision in Allen v. Prudential Prop-
erty & Casualty Insurance Co. 11 Rather than accept the reasonable expec-
tations doctrine, the majority of the court instead decided to proceed "inter-
stitially" by relying on common law equitable doctrines which had "yet to 
be fully developed in Utah" to protect the insured party against overreach-
ing insurers. 12 
The purpose of this comment is to first evaluate the Allen court's rea-
soning and then the effectiveness of the court's "interstitial" approach in 
light of recent Utah appellate court case law. Part II will begin by provid-
ing a brief history of the development and general acceptance of the rea-
sonable expectations doctrine. Part III will provide an overview of Allen v. 
Prudential Property & Casualty Co. and the opinions of the divided court 
which resulted in the rejection of the reasonable expectations doctrine. Part 
IV then analyzes the majority's reasoning leading to the rejection of the 
doctrine, and thereafter analyzes the effectiveness of the Allen majority's 
"interstitial" approach by briefly surveying appellate decisions applying 
this approach. Finally, Part V concludes the Utah Supreme Court should 
abandon Allen's interstitial approach in favor of fully adopting the reason-
7. See id. at 961. 
8. /d.; see also Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions: 
Part Two, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1970) [hereinafter Keeton, Rights at Variance: Part Two]. 
9. Keeton, supra note I, at 967. 
I 0. For a recent survey of jurisdictions who have considered the reasonable expectations 
doctrine, see Max True Plastering Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 912 P.2d 861 (Okla. 
1996), which noted that at the time of the court's decision to adopt the reasonable expectations 
doctrine, thirty six jurisdictions had considered its application, with only four courts (including Utah) 
clearly rejecting the doctrine. See infra note 29. 
II. 839 P.2d 798 (Utah 1992) (rejecting the reasonable expectations doctrine by a three-two 
decision) (Stewart, J., concurring) (concurring in the result but dissenting in the rejection of the 
reasonable expectations doctrine) (Durham, J., dissenting). 
12. /d. at 806. The court cited estoppel, waiver, unconscionability, the duty of good faith and 
fair dealing, the doctrine of construing ambiguities against the drafter, and tort remedies such as 
fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and the breach of fiduciary duty as doctrines which could provide 
adequate protection to the insured. /d. at 805-06 & n.l6. 
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able expectations doctrine in Utah as set forth by the Arizona Supreme 
Court. 
II. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE REASONABLE 
EXPECTATIONS DOCTRINE 
A. Origins and Nature of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine 
In a broad survey of case law recognizing insurance law rights of in-
sured parties which were at variance with policy provisions, Professor 
Keeton offered two broad, overarching principles as an explanation for 
"what might otherwise appear to be deviant decisions."13 The first princi-
ple was that courts will deny the insurer an unconscionable advantage in 
an insurance transaction, in spite of the informed consent of the insured. 14 
The second principle, which Professor Keeton recognized as an emerging 
principle which arose in insurance contexts "with distinctive frequency," 
was that "the reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficia-
ries will be honored."15 Professor Keeton described the reasonable expec-
tations principle16 in the following way: "[t]he objectively reasonable ex-
pectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of 
insurance contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of the 
policy provisions would have negated those expectations."17 Professor 
Keeton argued this second principle explained the reasoning for many de-
cisions which were otherwise unjustified deviations of similar equitable 
principles, most notably the principle of construing ambiguities against the 
drafter. 18 
Professor Keeton's review of court decisions and description of how 
the reasonable expectations principle should be applied demonstrates that 
the primary concern of the reasonable expectations principle is objective 
fairness to both parties. 19 Thus, Professor Keeton's statement of the gen-
eral principle does not offer an exhaustive "bright line" rule; rather, his 
analysis shows that the applicability of the reasonable expectations princi-
13. Keeton, supra note I, at 961. 
14. See id. at 963. 
15. /d. at 961 -62. Professor Keeton has been credited as the first to recognize the emergence 
of this principle by viewing cases involving disparate subject matters. See, e.g., Henderson, supra 
note 3, at 825. 
16. See infra Part II.B. for a discussion on the evolution of the reasonable expectations 
"principle" into a "doclrine." 
17. Keeton, supra note I, at 967. 
18. See id. at 972. While these equitable doctrines are similar to the reasonable expectations 
principle, Professor Keeton argued the reasonable expectations principle was broader in scope. See 
also id. at 967. 
19. See id. at 966-77. 
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pie should be determined on a case-by-case basis with a careful analysis of 
each factual situation.20 
For example, Professor Keeton explained that although courts will 
honor an insured's reasonable expectation even though a "painstaking 
study" of the contract would negate that expectation, whether the insured 
"sufficiently examined the policy" is still a factor in the "objectively rea-
sonable" analysis.21 The structure and nature of the insurance contract's 
provisions must, therefore, be considered when determining whether an 
insured's expectation is objectively reasonable. 22 Professor Keeton argued 
this objectively reasonable standard "produces an essential degree of cer-
tainty and predictability about legal rights, as well as a method of achiev-
ing equity not only between insurer and insured but also among different 
insureds whose contributions through premiums create the funds that are 
tapped to pay judgments against insurers.'m 
However, Professor Keeton also argued that where policy language is 
inconsistent with the objectively reasonable expectations of a person hav-
ing "an ordinary degree of familiarity with the type of coverage involved," 
or where a clause is "fundamentally unconscionable because it misleads 
the great majority of policyholders," the reasonable expectations principle 
should apply even if the provisions were "very explicit and unambigu-
ous. "24 Thus, while the insurer is not denied the right to limit the coverage 
of the policy, this right is qualified by the limits of reasonableness and un-
conscionability.25 Accordingly, Professor Keeton demonstrated a flexible 
analysis to achieve the overriding concern of fairness to the parties under 
the facts of a given case. This analysis in fact foreshadows the principles 
of the reasonable expectations doctrine which would later emerge in court 
decisions, which is best modeled by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS, § 211.26 
Finally, Professor Keeton also demonstrated that by explicitly recog-
nizing the reasonable expectations principle, courts could avoid distorting 
other equitable principles to reach a fair result.27 Accordingly, he argued 
that by openly recognizing this principle as a guide to future decisions, 
courts could provide more security for the insurance industry since the in-
20. See Keeton, Rights at Variance: Part Two, supra note 8, at 1320. 
21. Keeton, supra note I, at 967. Factors relevant in this analysis include the length of the 
contract, its complexity, and whether the insured receives the policy provisions long after paying the 
premiums and after the policy has been issued. See id. at 968. 
22. See id. at 967-68. 
23. /d. at 968. 
24. /d. at 968-69. 
25. See id. 
26. See infra Part II.B. for a discussion of the evolution of the reasonable expectations 
doctrine and section 211 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS. 
27. See Keeton, supra note I, at 966-74. 
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tegrity of other equitable doctrines, such as waiver, estoppel, and the rule 
that ambiguities are to be construed against the drafter, would not be 
stretched beyond the breaking point to avoid an unfair result. 28 
B. General Acceptance of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine 
Since Professor Keeton's early recognition of the reasonable expecta-
tions principle, the vast majority of courts who have considered its applica-
tion to insurance contracts have adopted it in some forrn. 29 The basic prin-
ciple of honoring the reasonable expectations of the non drafting party has 
also been adopted by the American Law Institute in section 211 of theRE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS,30 which has been considered a key 
factor in the acceptance of the doctrine. 31 More importantly, the current 
draft of Revised Article 2 of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE includes 
what is arguably an expansive version of the reasonable expectations doc-
trine which would be applicable to all consumer contracts,32 making wide 
28. See Keeton, Rights at Variance: Part Two, supra note 8, at 1322. 
29. For a fifty state survey of the acceptance of the reasonable expectations doctrine as of 
1990, see Henderson, supra note 3. See also Max True Plastering Co. v. United States Fidelity & 
Guar. Co., 912 P.2d 861 (Okla. 1996) (concluding prior to adopting the reasonable expectations 
doctrine that of the thirty six jurisdictions which have considered the application of the reasonable 
expectations doctrine, only four courts (including Utab) have rejected its adoption). Although some 
commentators have noted the acceptance of the doctrine is nothing more than a restatement of the 
principle thai ambiguities are construed against the drafter, see Hendersen, supra note 3, at 826-27, 
it is significant to note for the purpose of this comment the small number of outright rejections of 
the doctrine noted in Max True Plastering Co. Moreover, while the court in Max True Plastering 
Co. cited Illinois as one of the four states which had rejected the reasonable expectations doctrine, 
see 912 P.2d al 864 n.6, it is meaningful to note thai recent Illinois case law suggests this conclusion 
is a1 least open to question. See, e.g., Stone Container Corp. v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection Co., 
936 F. Supp. 487, 501 n.l3 (N.D. lll. 1996) (concluding the Illinois Supreme Court would "likely" 
hold the reasonable expectations doctrine applicable in Illinois in light of recent case law holding the 
court may consider the policyholder's "reasonable expectations" in determining when coverage is 
appropriate). 
/d. 
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND} OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1979). Section 211 provides as follows: 
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (3}, where a party to an agreement signs or 
otherwise manifests assent to a writing and has reason to believe that like writings are 
regularly used to embody terms of agreements of the same type, he adopts the writing 
as an integrated agreement with respect to the terms included in the writing. 
(2) Such a writing is interpreted wherever reasonable as treating alike all those 
similarly situated, without regard to their knowledge or understanding of the standard 
terms of the writing. 
(3) Where the other party has reason to believe thai the party manifesting such assent 
would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a particular term, the term is not 
part of the agreement. 
31. See Henderson, supra note 3, at 11, 15. 
32. Draft, U.C.C. REVISED ARTICLE 2 SALES § 2-206 (Nal'1 Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. 
State Laws, March 1, 1998}, (visited February 19, 1998) <http://www.law.upenn.edullibrary/u1c/-
ulc.htm>. This current draft of Revised Article 2 includes two alternatives: 
Alternative A 
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spread legislative adoption of the reasonable expectations doctrine proba-
ble in the future. 
Many courts who have adopted the reasonable expectations doctrine 
have done so because of the inadequacies of other equitable doctrines nor-
mally applied to form contracts, which are seen as failing to account for 
the realities of the modem insurance industry.33 Commentators have also 
noted there is no "true" assent to the boilerplate terms of form contracts,34 
and have therefore recommended applying the reasonable expectations 
doctrine as an objective method of finding the true intent of the parties. 35 
Since the object is to discover the parties' true intent, it "does not automat-
ically favor either the drafter or the consumer, but attempts to give both 
parties full freedom of contract together."36 While the doctrine has re-
ceived some criticism from camps relying on an economic analysis, a ma-
jority of the commentary has been favorable?7 
/d. 
(a) In a consumer contract, if a consumer agrees to a record, any non-negotiated term 
that a reasonable consumer in a transaction of this type would not reasonably expect to 
be in the record is excluded from the contract, unless the consumer had knowledge of the 
term before agreeing to the record. 
(b) Before deciding whether to exclude a term under subsection (a), the court, on 
motion of a party or its own motion, shall afford the parties a reasonable and expeditious 
opportunity to present evidence on whether the term should be included or excluded from 
the contract. The court may exclude a term under this section only if it finds that the 
term is bizarre or oppressive [harsh or "one-sided] [sic} by industry standards or 
commercial practices, abrogates or substantially conflicts with other negotiated terms, 
eliminates the dominate purpose of the contract, or conflicts with other consumer 
protection laws. 
(c) This section shall not operate to exclude an otherwise enforceable term 
disclaiming or modifying an implied warranty. 
Alternative B 
(a) In a consumer contract, a consumer adopts the terms of a [standard form] 
record by manifesting assent to the record [2B-112] after having an opportunity to 
review. [2B-113]. However, a term does not become part of the contract if it is 
unconscionable or conflicts with any negotiated term of the agreement between the 
parties. [2B-208(a)] 
(b) This section shall not operate to exclude an otherwise enforceable term 
disclaiming or modifying an implied warranty[.] 
33. See, e.g., Max True Plastering Co., 912 P.2d at 865. 
34. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 3, at 8. 
35. See Max True Plastering Co., 912 P.2d at 865. 
36. Meyerson, supra note 3, at 1266 (emphasis added). 
37. See generally James J. White, Form Contracts Under Revised Article 2, 75 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 315 (1997) for a discussion criticizing the application of the reasonable expectations doctrine 
to consumer contracts. See also Stephen J. Ware, Comment, A Critique of the Reasonable 
Expectations Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1461 (1989). However, the reach of the reasonable 
expectations doctrine has not been as far as critics have predicted, and generally has been applied 
in a conservative manner. See Henderson, supra note 3, at 841. 
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Of the courts38 who have rejected the adoption of the reasonable ex-
pectations doctrine, some have done so out of concern that the "periphery 
of what losses would be covered" would be expanded too far through the 
insured's assertions of what he "reasonably expected."39 Some of these 
courts have also expressed concern that the doctrine calls for the judicial 
rewriting of insurance contracts, which is criticized as impermissible judi-
cial activism.40 Other courts have noted resistance to the doctrine for fear 
of increasing uncertainty in the insurance industry and spawning additional 
litigation.41 Finally, some of these courts have reasoned that the protection 
offered by the rule is not necessary in light of the rule construing ambigu-
ities in favor of the insured.42 
Many versions of the reasonable expectations doctrine have developed 
since Professor Keeton's early recognition of the principle, which has re-
sulted in some confusion (and criticism) about the scope of the doctrine.43 
As Roger C. Henderson explained in his twenty-year overview of the rea-
sonable expectations doctrine, some confusion is inevitable in the evolu-
tion of the early recognition of a "principle" into a full-blown doctrine, or 
a "body of law from which particular cases can be readily resolved."44 
Some uncertainty of the doctrine has therefore been inevitable in the case-
by-case evolution of the reasonable expectations doctrine. However, the 
nature and scope of the doctrine will become increasingly clear, as other 
equitable doctrines have done in the past, and "one may predict with con-
38. States who have rejected the application of the reasonable expectations doctrine include 
Idaho, Ohio, Utah, and most recently Florida. See Deni Assoc. of Florida v. State Farm Fire & Cas. 
Ins. Co., 1998 WL 29822 (Fla. 1998) (declining to adopt the doctrine because of adequacy of prior 
Florida law requiring ambiguities to be construed against the drafter; court should not rewrite the 
contract if no ambiguity exists); Max True Plastering Co., 912 P.2d at 864 n.6 (finding Idaho, 
lllinois, Ohio, and Utah as jurisdictions who have rejected the adoption of the reasonable expectations 
doctrine). While the court in Max True Plastering Co. cited Illinois as a state that had rejected the 
reasonable expectations doctrine, see id., this conclusion has since become suspect. See supra note 
29. For a discussion on Utah's reasoning for rejecting the reasonable expectations doctrine, see infra 
Parts III.B.2., IV. 
39. See Casey v. Highlands Ins. Co., 600 P.2d 1387, 1391 (Idaho 1979). This statement from 
the Idaho Supreme Court seems to be a concern for the subjective expectations of the insured, rather 
than the objective analysis described by Professor Keeton. See supra Part !I.A. 
40. See Sterling Merchandise Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 506 N.E.2d 1192, 1197 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1986). 
41. See Deni Assoc. of Florida, 1998 WL 29822, at *5 n.4 (relying on an "answer brief" of 
the Florida Department of Insurance for this proposition). 
42. See Casey, 600 P.2d at 1391 (stating that where there is ambiguity, "special rules of 
construction apply to insurance contracts to protect the insured," and that no special rules should 
apply where there is no ambiguity); Deni Assoc. of Florida, 1998 WL 29822, at *5 (reasoning that 
there is "no need" for the reasonable expectations doctrine "because in Florida ambiguities are 
construed against the insurer"). 
43. See generally Henderson, supra note 3, for a survey of the different versions of the 
reasonable expectations doctrine. 
44. /d. at 838. 
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siderable confidence that ... any confusion over the nature of the doctrine 
itself will rapidly dissipate. "45 
III. THE REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS DOCTRINE IN UTAH 
A. Early Indications of Acceptance 
The case law prior to Allen indicated a general acceptance by Utah 
Courts of the principles underlying the reasonable expectations doctrine. 
Some of the early Utah Supreme Court cases regarding binding receipts in 
life insurance contracts, for example, showed a willingness of the court to 
grant the intended beneficiaries of insurance contracts rights at variance 
with express policy provisions, without regard to the equitable doctrine of 
construing ambiguities against the drafter.46 An early case on the ambigu-
ity doctrine also showed an example of the court stretching to find the 
word "theft" ambiguous in order to give effect to the "reasonable expecta-
tions of an ordinary business man."47 Significantly, case law regarding life 
insurance binding receipts and the stretching of the ambiguity doctrine 
were two areas where Professor Keeton first recognized the principle of 
honoring reasonable expectations at variance with policy provisions.48 Fi-
nally, it is also significant to note that Justice Zimmerman, the author of 
Allen, authored an opinion which relied on the principle of recognizing the 
"reasonable expectations" of the insured to determine the foreseeability of 
damages in insurance bad faith actions.49 
The most formal pronouncements of recognition of the reasonable ex-
pectations doctrine came first from the Utah Supreme Court in Farmers 
Insurance Exchange v. Call, where the court held the failure to disclose 
household exclusions in an automobile liability policy invalidated the ex-
45. /d. 
46. See, e.g., Long v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 507 P.2d 375 (Utah 1973) (holding that 
temporary insurance created by binding receipt notwithstanding express language in the receipt to 
the contrary); Prince v. Western Empire Life Ins. Co., 428 P.2d 163 (Utah 1967) (holding a contract 
for insurance was created where insured complied with all requirements on binding receipt and 
insurer delayed in approval process, notwithstanding express language to the contrary on binding 
receipt; no ambiguity discussed or relied upon in decision). 
47. P.E. Ashton Co. v. Joyner, 406 P.2d 306, 307 (Utah 1965) (quoting National Fire Ins. 
Co. of Hartford v. Slayden, 85 So. 2d 916, 917 (Miss. 1956)). While the court did not discuss 
precisely how the term "theft" was ambiguous, the court stated: 
This court is committed to the policy that, in case of ambiguity, uncertainty, or 
doubt, the terms of an insurance contract will be construed strictly against the insurer and 
in favor of the insured, and that the insured is entitled to the broadest protection that he 
could reasonably believe the commonly understood meaning afforded him. 
P.E. Ashton Co., 406 P.2d. at 308 (emphasis added). The court thereafter gave the word "theft" a 
definition which included the unauthorized taking of the insured's vehicle by his thirteen year old 
son, thereby granting the insured coverage under the theft provision of the policy. /d. 
48. See Keeton, supra note 1, at 970-71 & n.l7. 
49. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 802 (Utah 1985). 
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elusions because the failure to notify "fails to 'honor the reasonable expec-
tations' of the purchaser."50 The reasonable expectations doctrine was 
again addressed in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. 
Mastbaum, although only by Justice Durham in her dissenting opinion.51 
It was not until the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in Wagner v. Farmers 
Insurance Exchange that the doctrine received any in depth discussion.52 
In Wagner, the court concluded the following factors should be considered 
when determining whether the reasonable expectations of an insured 
should be honored: "first, whether the insurer knew or should have known 
of the insured's expectations; second, whether the insurer created or 
helped to create these expectations; and third, whether the insured's expec-
tations are reasonable."53 
B. Allen v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co.: The Rejection 
of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine 
Whether the doctrine of reasonable expectations doctrine should be 
formally recognized in Utah was not fully discussed by the Utah Supreme 
Court until Allen v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co. 54 The 
following analysis will outline the facts of Allen, and will then summarize 
the reasoning of the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions. 
I. Facts 
Blaketta Allen and her husband purchased a homeowner's insurance 
policy from Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company ("Pru-
dential") in 1981.55 This policy contained a "household exclusion" in an 
attached endorsement, which excluded from coverage members of the 
Aliens' household. 56 The Prudential agent who sold the policy did not 
mention the existence of the household exclusion; however, he did inform 
Mr. Allen that the policy provisions would be mailed to him and advised 
Mr. Allen to review the policy when he received it.57 While the policy, 
with the attached endorsement containing the household exclusion, was 
received two months after meeting with the agent, neither of the Aliens 
read the endorsement.58 A year later, upon purchasing a trampoline, Mr. 
50. 712 P.2d 231, 237 (Utah 1985) (quoting Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Royle, 656 P.2d 820, 
824 (Mont. I 983)). 
51. 748 P.2d 1042, 1045-1049 (Utah 1987) (Durham, J., dissenting). 
52. 786 P.2d 763 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
53. /d. at 766. 
54. 839 P.2d 798, 799 (Utah 1992). 
55. See id. at 799. 
56. /d. 
57. See id. 
58. See id. 
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Allen met with an agent of Prudential to increase the policy coverage. 59 
Mr. Allen testified in depositions that he informed the Prudential agent his 
reason for increasing coverage was "to make sure anyone who got hurt on 
the trampoline would be covered."60 
After the policy coverage was increased, the Aliens' two year old son 
was injured when Mrs. Allen spilled a pot of boiling water on him.61 Mr. 
Allen contacted the Prudential agent to seek recovery against the policy, 
and was then orally informed for the first time of the household exclu-
sion.62 Prudential denied coverage based on the exclusion, after which 
Mrs. Allen filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to invalidate the 
household exclusion because it violated her reasonable expectations.63 Pru-
dential moved for summary judgment, arguing the policy was unambigu-
ous and did not violate public policy. Prudential's motion was granted by 
the district court.64 Allen then appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, where 
the court affirmed the district court's ruling on summary judgment. 65 
2. Reasoning 
In affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment, the major-
ity took occasion to evaluate the merits of the reasonable expectations doc-
trine. The majority first gave a brief overview of the development of the 
reasonable expectations doctrine, as well as a brief overview of the uncer-
tainty that has surrounded the doctrine.66 The court then analyzed what it 
felt were three formulations of the doctrine advanced by Allen, and there-
after rejected the application of the reasonable expectations doctrine in 
Utah. 67 
Two of the "versions" of the reasonable expectations doctrine ad-
vanced by Allen were disposed of in a summary fashion by the court.68 
59. See id. at 803. 
60. /d. at 809. 
61. See id. at 799. 
62. See id. at 799-800. 
63. See id. at 800. 
64. See id. 
65. See id at 807. 'The court was divided by a three-two split on the issue of whether Utah 
should formally adopt the reasonable expectations doctrine, with Justice Stewart concurring only in 
the result but dissenting in the rejection of the reasonable expectations docuine, and Justice Durham 
dissenting. See infra Parts ill.B.3., 4. 
66. See id. at 801-03. The majority mainly relied on a brief survey of the New Jersey and 
Iowa Supreme Courts for its conclusions as to the uncertainty of the doctrine. See id. at 802. See 
supra Part II.B. for a discussion on the development of the reasonable expectations doctrine. 
67. Prior to the majority's analysis, the court explicitly assumed Allen had raised a factual 
issue as to whether her expectations for coverage were reasonable. /d. at 801. Justice Stewart 
expressly disagreed with the majority's assumption as unfounded in fact. See id. at 808 (Stewart, J. 
dissenting). 
68. The Allen majority referred to Allen's arguments as advancing three separate theories, or 
"versions" of the reasonable expectations doctrine, and then proceeded to analyze each separate 
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The first version the court addressed was Allen's argument that Pruden-
tial's homeowners policy was an adhesion contract, and consequently "the 
court should have enforced her allegedly reasonable expectations as a mat-
ter of course."69 The court stated that this reason, by itself, was not enough 
to enforce an insured's reasonable expectations, noting that it knew of no 
authority to "take[] such an expansive view of the reasonable expectations 
doctrine. "70 
The third argument advanced by Allen was that the household exclu-
sion provision was ambiguous.71 The majority noted "[a]lthough [Allen's] 
brief is unclear as to the consequences of the alleged ambiguity, we as-
sume that she wants the court to find that the exclusion is ambiguous and 
therefore enforce her reasonable expectations."72 With this assumption, the 
court then held this argument was similar to the version of the reasonable 
expectations doctrine recognized in several states which requires a finding 
of an ambiguity before courts will enforce the reasonable expectations of 
an insured party.73 While the court noted its doubts about whether this ver-
sion of the doctrine differed from the rule that ambiguities are construed 
against the drafter, the court held there was no occasion to consider this 
issue, since "the disputed exclusion is not ambiguous."74 
Only during the discussion of Allen's "second version of the reason-
able expectations doctrine" did the majority fully discuss the propriety of 
adopting the reasonable expectations doctrine in Utah.75 Allen argued the 
Utah Supreme Court should adopt the Utah Court of Appeals' formulation 
of reasonable expectations doctrine as set forth in Wagner v. Farmer's In-
surance Exchange.16 Although the majority noted Allen's arguments of 
how she satisfied the three elements of the Wagner formula of the reason-
able expectations doctrine,77 the court did not analyze or discuss the merits 
of the Wagner formula. 78 Rather, the court focused more on whether ac-
version. /d. at 801. 
69. /d. at 803. 
70. /d. 
71. See id. at 807. 
72. /d. 
73. See id. See also supra note 18 and accompanying text for a discussion of the difference 
between the reasonable expectations doctrine and the rule that ambiguities are construed against the 
drafter. 
74. /d. at 807. 
75. /d. at 803-07. 
76. 786 P.2d 763 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). For a discussion of Wagner and the Court of 
Appeals' formulation of the reasonable expectations doctrine, see supra Part liLA. 
77. Allen, 839 P.2d at 803-07. 
78. Justice Stewart, in his concurrence, criticized the majority opinion for rejecting the 
reasonable expectations doctrine without defining the doctrine except only in the most general terms, 
"leaving the reader with the impression that the reasonable expectations doctrine would allow courts 
to engage in wholesale rewriting of insurance policies simply because an insured expected coverage." 
/d. at 810 (Stewart, J ., concurring). 
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cepting the reasonable expectations doctrine was permissible under Utah's 
law governing the insurance industry. 
The court began by finding "legislative and executive ... occupation" 
of the field of the insurance industry in Utah's insurance code.79 The court 
noted the Code establishes an "Insurance Department" headed by a Com-
missioner, and that "[p ]reprinted policies for household insurance" such as 
Prudential's must under the code be filed with the Commissioner.80 The 
majority then noted that under the insurance code, the Commissioner "may 
disapprove a preprinted policy at any time if it is found to be 'inequitable, 
unfairly discriminatory, misleading, deceptive, obscure or encourages mis-
representation.' "81 Based on this procedure, the court held "the validity of 
preprinted insurance contracts is premised on executive approval, a regula-
tory mechanism that the Wagner version of the reasonable expectations 
doctrine would largely undermine."82 
To buttress the conclusion of legislative and executive deference, the 
majority reviewed prior case law on the issue of upholding the validity of 
insurance policy provisionsY The majority concluded these cases showed 
the court's "tradition of deferring to the legislature on questions of general 
policy when considering the validity of insurance policies,"84 and an "un-
willingness [of the court] to alter fundamentally the terms of insurance pol-
icies in the absence of legislative direction."85 The majority also concluded 
these cases demonstrated an "uneasiness of the majority of this court with 
the notion of a reasonable expectations doctrine."86 
In spite of the above analysis, the majority also stated: 
"[n]otwithstanding our deference to legislative policy in this area, we nec-
essarily retain authority to invalidate insurance provisions that are found 
contrary to public policy as expressed in the common law of contracts that 
has not been preempted by legislative enactment."87 The majority noted 
79. !d. at 804; see generally UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-1-101 to -29-123 (1991) for the 1991 
provisions of the code which were relied upon by the majority (current version at § 31A-2-101 to 
-34-111 (1994 & Supp. 1997)). 
80. Allen, 839 P.2d at 804. 
81. !d. (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-201(2)(a)(I) (1991)) (current version at§ 31A-21-
201(2)(a)(i) (1994)). 
82. Allen, 839 P.2d at 804. 
83. See id. at 804-05. The court cited three decisions in support of this proposition: General 
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Martinez, 668 P.2d 498 (Utah 1983) (invalidating an exclusion due to 
the insured's failure to deliver the policy); Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 
1985) (invalidating exclusions, but properly only to the extent the exclusion contradicted policy; 
portion of ca~e relying on reasonable expectations argument dismissed as erroneous by the Allen 
majority); and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Mastbaum, 748 P.2d 1042 (Utah 
1987) (invalidating a household exclusion based on its inconsistency with statue). 
84. Allen, 839 P.2d at 804. 
85. /d. at 805. 
86. !d. 
87. /d. 
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that while the reasonable expectations doctrine has been advanced because 
of "the supposed inadequacy of the existing equitable doctrines available 
to courts confronted with overreaching insurers[,] ... no such inadequacy 
has been shown to exist in Utah."88 The majority reasoned that since Utah 
"has yet to address and develop fully any of the existing equitable doc-
trines available to an aggrieved insured," there was not yet any theoretical 
inadequacy of these equitable doctrines to protect insured parties. 89 The 
majority mentioned the doctrines of "estoppel, waiver, unconscionability, 
breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, and the rule that 
ambiguous language is to be resolved against the drafter,"90 as well as tort 
remedies which "may be available to an aggrieved insured under appropri-
ate circumstances,"91 as possible doctrines which could provide adequate 
protection. 
Finally, the majority relied on notions of freedom of contract for its 
decision to reject the reasonable expectations doctrine, which the majority 
found to be expressed in the "legislative policy underlying the insurance 
code."92 The majority reasoned "our decision today to proceed interstitially 
with existing equitable doctrines rather than to adopt a new doctrine with 
unknown ramifications is consistent with [this] legislative policy."93 
3. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart concurred only in the "con-
clusion that the household exclusion contained in plaintiff's homeowner's 
insurance policy is valid."94 He refused, however, to adopt what he charac-
terized as "the majority's wholesale disavowal of the reasonable expecta-
tions doctrine," which he argued was "dicta and not binding in any other 
case."95 He did, however, respond to the court's "dicta" rejecting the rea-
sonable expectations doctrine, arguing that the future adoption of the rea-
sonable expectations doctrine may be "essential to reach a fair result" in 
cases where existing equitable doctrines are inapplicable.96 Justice Stewart 
also took issue with the court's argument that the reasonable expectations 
doctrine interfered with the freedom of contract, arguing that the doctrine 
88. /d. 
89. /d. at 806 (emphasis added). 
90. /d. at 805-06 (footnotes omitted). 
91. /d. at 806 n. I 6 (mentioning fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary 
duty as potentially available tort remedies to an aggrieved insured). 
92. /d. at 806(citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-l-102(7) (1991)). 
93. Allen, 839 P.2d at 806 .. 
94. /d. at 807 (Stewart, 1 ., concurring). 
95. /d. at 807-08. 
96. /d. at 810-1 I. In support of this argument, Justice Stewart cited Tonkovic v. State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 521 A.2d 920 (Pa. 1987), where an insured received different 
coverage than requested, as an example of a situation where none of the equitable doctrines cited 
by the majority would apply. Allen, 839 P.2d at 81 I. 
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"does not interlere with the freedom of contract, but merely ensures that 
the parties' intent be effectuated."97 Finally, Justice Stewart disagreed with 
the majority's position that the legislative and executive role in the insur-
ance industry precluded acceptance of the reasonable expectations doc-
trine, as well as the majority's argument that adopting the doctrine con-
flicted with past decisions.98 Instead, Justice Stewart argued the reasonable 
expectations doctrine is consistent with the statutory policy of ensuring all 
parties are treated fairly and equitably.99 
In his analysis of the facts of this case, Justice Stewart concluded Al-
len had failed to establish any "objective basis to show her expectation was 
reasonable," and he therefore took issue with the majority's assumption 
that this expectation was reasonable to reach the issue of the validity of the 
reasonable expectations doctrine. 100 Accordingly, Justice Stewart would 
have affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, but would 
have saved the issue of whether Utah should adopt the reasonable expecta-
tions doctrine for another day. 
4. Justice Durham's dissenting opinion 
In contrast with Justice Stewart, Justice Durham would have taken the 
opportunity to "hold that the doctrine of reasonable expectations as applied 
to insurance contracts is viable in Utah."101 However, her arguments 
against the majority's rejection of the reasonable expectations doctrine 
were similar to those of Justice Stewart. Justice Durham argued the major-
ity's reliance on freedom of contract principles was "anachronistic and un-
realistic," and that the majority erred in its view that the legislative and 
executive branches had occupied the field of insurance regulation in such a 
way as to render "court development of applicable contract principles ille-
gitimate."102 Justice Durham noted that "the majority of ... scholarly com-
mentary on the doctrine of reasonable expectations is favorable," 103 and 
proceeded to argue that societal changes and the special risks to the in-
sured in the insurance industry warranted the application of the reasonable 
expectations doctrine. 104 Consequently, Justice Durham would have 
adopted a detailed version of the reasonable expectations doctrine ad-
vanced by Professor Mark C. Rahdert, which seeks to balance the rights of 
the parties by subjecting "policy provision[s] that arbitrarily serve[s] the 
97. 839 P.2d at 809. 
98. See id. at 811-12. 
99. See id. at 812 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-1-102(2) (1991)). 
100. Allen, 839 P.2d at 808 (emphasis added). 
101. /d. at 812 (Durham, J., dissenting). 
102. /d. 
103. /d. at 813. 
104. See id. at 813-16. 
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insurer's interest without furthering a legitimate underwriting purpose" to 
close scrutiny. 105 
N. ANALYSIS OF THE REASONING OF AUEN AND THE APPLICATION OF 
THE INTERSTITIAL APPROACH 
Part A of this analysis examines the reasoning of the Allen majority's 
decision to reject the reasonable expectations doctrine and concludes the 
majority failed to consider the most recent statutory changes of the Insur-
ance Code, failed to consider the Rules of the Utah Insurance Commis-
sioner, was inconsistent in its reasoning, and failed to give adequate con-
sideration for the policy of the Insurance Code to "ensure that policy hold-
ers, claimants, and insurers are treated fairly and equitably."106 Part B then 
examines whether the Allen majority reached its stated goal of providing 
the insured adequate protection through the interstitial approach by re-
viewing the effects of Allen in recent Utah appellate court decisions. 
A. Basis for Rejecting the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine 
In rejecting the reasonable expectations doctrine, the majority relied 
primarily on three propositions: first, the reasonable expectations doctrine 
constitutes improper judicial intrusion on the executive and legislative 
branches; second, notwithstanding the executive and legislative branches' 
occupation of the field of insurance law, the court has authority to review 
and invalidate provisions using "traditional equitable principles;" and 
third, the reasonable expectations doctrine impermissibly impinges on the 
legislative policy of maintaining the freedom of contract. Each of these 
propositions will be discussed in turn. 
1. Improper judicial intrusion on the executive and legislative branches 
The majority found evidence of the "legislative and executive 
branches' occupation of this field" from the fact that the Utah Code creates 
an Insurance Department and section 31A-21-201 requires the filing of all 
preprinted policies with the Department. 107 More specifically, it appears 
the majority relied primarily on the authority of the Commissioner of the 
Insurance Department to disapprove a preprinted policy under section 
31 A-21-201 of the Code to conclude that preprinted insurance policies 
105. Id. at 816-17 (citing Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18 CONN. 
L. REV. 323, 374-92 (1986)). 
106. UTAH CODE ANN.§ 31A-I-102(2) (1994). 
107. Allen, 839 P.2d at 804 (citing UTAH CODE ANN.§ 31A-21-201 (1991)) (current version 
at § 31A-21-201 (1994)) . 
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receive "executive approval."108 This finding of executive approval of in-
surance forms enabled the majority to infer that the reasonable expecta-
tions doctrine would improperly intrude upon the providence of the execu-
tive branch, the Commissioner, or the legislative branch, who established 
this procedure. 109 
The majority's finding of "approval" of these forms from the filing 
requirement of section 31A-21-201 is erroneous for two reasons. First, the 
conclusion is not supported by the statute itself. This section of the Code 
provides a mechanism whereby the insurance Commissioner "may" disap-
prove of a given policy if it is found to be "inequitable, unfairly discrimi-
natory, misleading, deceptive, obscure or encourages misrepresentation."110 
This language indicates the exercise of the Commissioner's power to dis-
approve preprinted policies is discretionary. Accordingly, the Commis-
sioner may also decline to disapprove a preprinted policy, even if the Com-
missioner found the policy to be inequitable, unfairly discriminatory, mis-
leading, deceptive, obscure, or encouraging misrepresentation. The discre-
tionary nature of the exercise of the Commissioner's power in this statute 
suggests further review of the courts is appropriate. 
Moreover, the statute further states this discretionary power may be 
exercised "at any time,"111 which also suggests the discretionary powers of 
the Commissioner in disapproving preprinted forms may be exercised long 
after the policy has been in effect. This further suggests the Commis-
sioner's review of preprinted policies is an ongoing process, rather than a 
one time affair. In contrast, the majority assumes that the Commissioner 
has approved of ali preprinted forms in use, thereby making judicial re-
view of these terms an inappropriate intrusion on the executive branch. 112 
Since the statutory language suggests that the Commissioner's review may 
take place after the policy has been in effect, judicial review once again 
seems appropriate. 
Significantly, at the time of the Allen decision, which was dated June 
22, 1992,113 the 1992 amendment to section 31 A-21-201 was effective. 114 
However, the majority cited to the 1991 version of this statute. 115 The 1992 
amendments explicitly set forth two instances where preapproval of 
preprinted forms may be required, 116 as opposed to all other forms where 
I 08. Allen, 839 P.2d at 804. 
109. See id. 
110. UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-201(3)(a) (1994) (emphasis added). 
Ill. !d. 
112. See Allen, 839 P.2d at 804. 
II 3. See id at 798. 
114. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-201 Amendment Notes (1994) (stating the 1992 
amendments became effective April 27, 1992). 
115. See Allen, 839 P.2d at 804. 
116. Subsection (3)(b) provides that "[o]nce a form has been disapproved, it may not be used 
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merely filing the form with the Commissioner is sufficient. 117 This contrast 
suggests again that other forms are not "approved" when they are filed, but 
instead are only subject to a discretionary review of the Commissioner. 
These amendments make the contrast between filing and approval more 
apparent, and therefore may have affected the majority's willingness to 
assume the "executive approval"118 of preprinted forms. 
Another key addition to section 31A-21-201 in the 1992 amendments 
is subsection (2), which states: "In filing a form for use in this state the 
insurer is responsible for assuring that the form is in compliance with this 
title and rules adopted by the commissioner."119 This subsection contrasts 
with the majority's apparent assumption that it is the Commissioner's re-
sponsibility, not the insurer, to ensure compliance with the law. This also 
contrasts with the majority's assumption that preprinted policies are ap-
proved by the executive branch. 120 
The second reason the majority's assumption of approval is erroneous 
is found in the Insurance Rules of the Insurance Department. The Unfair 
Marketing Practices Rule sets forth practices which the Insurance Com-
missioner finds are "misleading, deceptive, unfairly discriminatory, pro-
vide an unfair inducement, or unreasonably restrain competition."121 Rule 
590-154-5, entitled "Claiming or Representing Department Approval," 
states in pertinent part the following: 
No licensee may represent either directly or indirectly that 
the Utah Insurance Department, the Insurance Commissioner, 
or any employee of the department, has approved, reviewed, 
endorsed, or in any way favorably passed upon any marketing 
program, insurance product, insurance company, practice or 
act. 
A licensee may report the fact of the filing of any form, 
financial report, or other document with the Insurance Depart-
ment, ... but may not misrepresent their effect or import.122 
Accordingly, not only does this rule counter the majority's presumption of 
"executive approval" based on the filing requirements of section 31A-21-
unless appropriate changes are filed with and approved by the commissioner." UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 31A-21-201(3)(b) (1994) (emphasis added). Subsection (4) provides that, after a hearing, the 
commissioner may require by rule or order that "certain forms be subject to the commissioner's 
approval prior to their use." §31A-21-201(4) (emphasis added). 
117. See UTAH CoDE ANN. § 31A-21-201(1) (1994) ("No form ... may be used ... unless 
it has been filed with the commissioner.") 
118. 839 P.2d at 804. 
119. UTAH CODE ANN.§ 31A-2!-201(2) (1994) (emphasis added). 
120. See 839 P.2d at 804. 
121. UTAH ADMIN. CODER. 590-154-1 (West, WESTLAW through October I, 1997 Sess.). 
122. UTAH ADMIN. CODER. 590-154-5 (West, WESTLAW through October I, 1997 Sess.) 
(emphasis added). 
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201, but this rule further states that the Commissioner finds representations 
of the commissioner's approval of pre-filed forms to be misleading and 
deceptive. 
As mentioned above, the majority further relied on past decisions for 
additional support of the conclusion that judicial intrusion in the field of 
insurance is inappropriate. 123 The majority relied on three decisions in sup-
port of this proposition: General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Martinez, 124 
Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Call, 125 and State Farm Mutual Automo-
bile Insurance Co. v. Mastbaum. 126 Although Call held that a policy provi-
sion was invalid because it violated the insured's reasonable 
expectations, 127 the Allen majority dismissed this holding of "[t]wo mem-
bers of this court and a district judge sitting by designation" as errone-
ous.128 Aside from whether these cases do in fact "show [the court's] un-
willingness to alter fundamentally the terms of insurance policies in the 
absence of legislative direction,"129 conspicuously absent from the court's 
analysis are the many decisions invalidating policy provisions based on 
common law doctrines, including the cases discussed above in Part ITI.A. 
that invalidate clear policy provisions under principles consistent with the 
reasonable expectations doctrine without legislative direction. 130 
As a result, the majority's assumption of executive approval is appar-
ently erroneous in light of both the 1992 amendments and the Insurance 
Rules. Furthermore, the majority's arguments that prior case law demon-
strates an unwillingness to alter policy provisions absent legislative direc-
tion is at least inconsistent with the entire body of Utah case law on insur-
ance. Since the majority's conclusion that the reasonable expectations doc-
trine constitutes an improper judicial intrusion on the executive and legis-
lative branches is based on these two arguments, this conclusion is simi-
larly questionable. 
2. Retention of authority to review insurance contract provisions 
The second proposition relied on by the Allen majority in refusing to 
adopt the reasonable expectations doctrine is the majority's opinion that 
123. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of the cases cited 
below and the majority's reliance on these cases. 
124. 668 P.2d 498 (Utah 1983). 
125. 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985). 
126. 748 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1987). 
127. 712 P.2d at 236-37. 
128. Allen v. Prudential Property & Cas. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 805 (Utah 1992). Justices Stewart 
and Durham were the two members of the court who ruled in the majority opinion of Call. See Call, 
712 P.2d at 232, 38. 
129. Allen, 839 P.2d at 805. But see id. at 812 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (contending that the 
cited cases "simply do not say" that the court is unwilling to alter policy language absent legislative 
direction). 
130. Supra Part ill.A. 
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the existing common law equitable doctrines, which have yet to be fully 
developed in Utah, are sufficient to protect insured parties against "over-
reaching insurers."131 The majority reasoned that "notwithstanding" the 
court's deference to the executive and legislative occupation of this field, 
the court "retained authority" to review and invalidate provisions which 
violated these equitable common law doctrines. 132 Thus the majority of the 
Allen court chose to "proceed interstitially with existing equitable doc-
trines" rather than adopt the reasonable expectations doctrine. 133 
The line the majority seeks to walk in this reasoning is indeed a pre-
carious one. As discussed above, 134 the majority opinion relies on the as-
sumption that, because of the regulatory mechanisms of the Insurance 
Code, the legislative and executive branches of the government occupy the 
field of insurance, thus making judicial review of insurance form contracts 
via the reasonable expectations doctrine an inappropriate intrusion. 135 It is 
at least somewhat inconsistent for the Allen majority to then rely on judi-
cial review via equitable principles of the common law as a basis for refus-
ing to apply the reasonable expectations doctrine. It is similarly inconsis-
tent for the court to argue judicial alteration of policy provisions is inap-
propriate "absen[t] legislative direction,"136 and then hold that courts retain 
the auth01ity to review policy provisions under a laundry list of equitable 
doctrines without citing any statutory authority for this proposition. 
Moreover, one of the reasons the majority rejected the application of 
the reasonable expectations doctrine is that there was "great uncertainty" 
in the scope and application of the doctrine, 137 and that the doctrine had 
"unknown ramifications."138 However, if Utah has "yet to address and de-
velop fully any of the existing equitable doctrines available to an aggrieved 
insured,"139 it is difficult to assess how reliance on undeveloped equitable 
doctrines will provide greater certainty in scope and application, since one 
cannot discern the limits or direction of the court's apparent intention to 
expand these doctrines for the benefit of insured persons. 
Finally, absent from the court's decision is an attempt to apply any of 
the equitable doctrines of the interstitial approach. Such a demonstration 
would have perhaps caused the court to face and resolve some of the above 
inconsistencies. Indeed, the above inconsistencies demonstrate a funda-
mental problem with the overall effect of Allen. Lower courts are faced 
131. Allen, 839 P.2d at 805-06. 
132. !d. at 806. 
133. /d. 
134. See supra Part IV.A.l. 
135. See 839 P.2d at 804. 
136. /d. at 805. 
137. !d. at 803. 
138. !d. at 806. 
139. /d. at 806 (emphasis added). 
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with the dilemma of choosing between strong statements that judicial alter-
ation of insurance contracts constitutes an impermissible infringement on 
the legislative and executive branches, and language from the court sug-
gesting (without providing guidance by example) that courts should apply 
and develop common law equitable doctrines to protect an aggrieved in-
sured.140 
3. Freedom of contract 
In rejecting the reasonable expectations doctrine the majority also re-
lied on the notion that the doctrine impermissibly impinges on the "legis-
lative policy underlying the Insurance Code ... that 'freedom of contract' 
be maintained, and that written contracts be the primary means by which 
this freedom to contract be exercised."141 The majority concluded without 
analysis that the "[a]doption of the reasonable expectations doctrine poses 
a much greater risk of broadly undermining these legislative goals [of 
maintaining the freedom of contract] than our continued use of existing 
equitable doctrines applied on a case-by-case analysis."142 
However, since the court stated earlier that Utah courts have "yet to 
address and develop fully any of the existing equitable doctrines available 
to an aggrieved insured,"143 it is at least somewhat unclear how applying 
these doctrines will afford better protection of the principle of freedom of 
contract in the face of uncertain development. It is also unclear why the 
singular reasonable expectations doctrine, as opposed to multiple equitable 
doctrines, cannot also be applied "on a case-by-case basis"144 in such a 
manner as to afford similar protection of the freedom of contract. 
Furthermore, as discussed above,145 the strict application of traditional 
contract law assumes assent where it does not exist, thus subverting the 
intent of the parties. 146 By contrast, one of the objects of the reasonable 
expectations doctrine is to objectively discover the parties' intent and 
honor this intent, thus giving "both parties full freedom of contract to-
gether."141 The reasonable expectations doctrine, therefore, also affords 
protection for the principle of freedom of contract for both parties. 
140. See infra Part N.B. regarding the effect of the court's "interstitial" approach in the past 
five years; see infra Part N.A.3. for further discussion on the court's unwillingness to interfere with 
the insurance industry. 
141. Allen, 839 P.2d at 806 (citations omitted) (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 3JA-l-102(7) 
(1991)). 
142. 839 P.2d at 807. 
143. /d. at 806 (emphasis added). 
144. /d. 
145. See supra Part Il.B 
146. See Meyerson, supra note 3, at 1236. 
147. /d. at 1266 (emphasis added). 
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More importantly, as noted by Justice Stewart in his concurring opin-
ion, the majority opinion fails to address the "other policies underlying the 
Insurance Code, including 'to ensure that policyholder, claimants, and in-
surers are treated fairly and equitably.' " 148 While section 31A-1-1 02 does 
not place any priority in the list of eleven purposes of the Insurance Code, 
the analysis of the majority places heavy reliance on the legislative policy 
of freedom of contract and fails to address the ramifications of fairness and 
equity, a legislative policy expressed in this same statute. Indeed, as dis-
cussed above, 149 the main objective of the reasonable expectations doctrine 
is to satisfy this policy of fairness to both contracting parties. 
Finally, as mentioned by Justice Durham in her dissent, all of the equi-
table doctrines relied upon by the majority in its interstitial approach have 
been opposed at one time as an intrusion on the principle of freedom of 
contract. 150 However, as noted by Professor David Slawson, the principle 
of freedom of contract should not be used as a "license to defraud or, at 
least, to mislead."151 Instead, the reasonable expectations doctrine can be 
applied in a manner that "does not interfere with freedom of contract, but 
merely ensures that the parties' intent be effectuated."152 
B. Application of the Interstitial Approach of Allen v. Prudential Property 
& Casualty Co. 
Notwithstanding the above criticisms of the Allen majority's reason-
ing, the effects of the Allen decision could still be that the objectively rea-
sonable expectations of the insured are honored as the courts respond to 
the Utah Supreme Court's affirmation of its "responsibility" to develop the 
common law doctrines relating to insurance law. However, none of the 
reported insurance law decisions that have cited to Allen's interstitial ap-
proach have resulted in granting coverage to the insured. 153 Two of these 
148. 839 P.2d at 812 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-l-102(2) 
(1991)). 
149. See supra Part II.A. 
150. See Allen, 839 P.2d at 815 (Durham, J., dissenting) (citing Slawson, The New Meaning 
of Contract: The Transformation of Contracts Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 21 
(1984)). 
151. Slawson, supra note 150, at 55. 
152. Allen, 839 P.2d at 810 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
153. See AOK Lands, Inc., v. Shand, Morahan & Co., 860 P.2d 924 (Utah 1993) (holding a 
"claims made" policy does not violate the United States Constitution, Utah state Jaw, or public 
policy); Alf v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1993} (upholding validity of 
exclusion in homeowners insurance policy for "earth movement," despite fact that the cause of the 
earth movement was a covered peril); Nielsen v. O'Reilly, 848 P.2d 664 (Utah 1992) (holding policy 
provision prohibiting stacking of uninsured motorist coverage does not violate public policy); Nat'! 
Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co. v. Moore, 882 P.2d 1168 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (holding 
household exclusion in farmowners policy does not violate public policy); Goetz v. American Reliable 
Ins., 844 P.2d 366 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (holding exclusion of coverage under "other insurance" 
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decisions are particularly insightful on how the Allen majority's reasoning 
inhibits the court application of equitable doctrines and the review for fair-
ness to insurance contracts. 
1. Unconscionability: Nielsen v. O'Reilly 
Shortly after the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Allen v. Prudential 
Property & Casualty Co., the court decided Nielsen v. O'Reilly. 154 In Niel-
sen, Richard Nielsen purchased an insurance policy from Metropolitan 
Property & Liability Insurance Co. ("Metropolitan") which provided unin-
sured motorist protection on two of his vehicles, limited to $250,000 for 
each person and $500,000 for each accident. 155 Nielsen was later involved 
in an automobile accident with two uninsured motorists, which ultimately 
resulted in a damages award for Nielsen against the uninsured motorists 
for $707,590. 156 After trial, Nielsen sought to recover the full judgment 
against Metropolitan; Metropolitan, however, argued it was not liable for 
payment in excess of the $250,000 policy limits. 157 
On appeal, Nielsen argued, inter alia, that the policy provision prohib-
iting the stacking of his uninsured motorist coverage was contrary to pub-
lic policy and his reasonable expectation of being able to stack the policy 
limits. 158 In support of this argument, Nielsen pointed out "that uninsured 
motorist coverage, unlike liability coverage, is not linked to a particular 
vehicle but is a floating coverage that covers the insured for injuries and 
damages caused by uninsured motorists in all circumstances."159 Hence, 
because Nielsen paid two separate premiums for this coverage, he argued 
he should be permitted to stack the two policy limits for a total of 
$500,000, notwithstanding the language of the policy providing other-
wise.160 
The majority of the court refused to accept Nielsen's arguments, rea-
soning that the provision in the policy prohibiting the staking of policy 
limits was unambiguous. 161 The court then analyzed Nielsen's policy and 
reasonable expectations arguments as advancing an "unrecognized" ver-
sion of the reasonable expectations doctrine which "link[s] a reasonable 
provision of auto insurance policy not ambiguous). While the Supreme Court does cite to Allen's 
interstitial approach in Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996), and thereafter successfully applies 
the doctrine of unconscionability to the protection of the non-drafting party, this case deals with an 
arbitration contract and not an insurance contract, and is therefore inapposite to the issue of Allen's 
effectiveness in protecting insured persons. 
154. 848 P.2d 664 (Utah 1992). 
155. See id. at 665. 
156. See id. 
157. See id. 
158. See id. at 667. 
159. /d. at 666. 
160. See id. 
161. See id. at 666-67. 
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expectation of greater coverage to the payment of an additional amount in 
premiums."162 The court then relied on the reasoning and analysis of Allen 
to reject the application of this "version" of the reasonable expectations 
doctrine. 163 
However, in the dissenting opinion of Justice Stewart, in which Justice 
Durham joined, Justice Stewart did not revisit the issue of the viability of 
the reasonable expectations doctrine in Utah. Rather, Justice Stewart ana-
lyzed the case under the doctrine of unconscionability, which was noted by 
the Allen majority as a promising alternative to the reasonable expectations 
doctrine to protect insured parties against overreaching insurers. 164 Justice 
Stewart noted that because of the "floating" nature of uninsured coverage, 
an insured who pays two separate premiums for uninsured motorist cover-
age will always be covered under two policies; however, if the policy lan-
guage prohibits the stacking of the two policies, then the insurer will be 
able to collect premiums for the second policy while never giving the in-
sured the benefit of that policy. 165 Justice Stewart therefore argued it was 
fraudulent and unconscionable "to allow an insurance company to collect a 
second premium and give nothing in return on the ground that the insured 
consented to the fraud by virtue of a provision in the insurance con-
tract."166 Moreover, because this coverage is statutorily mandated for all 
vehicles, Justice Stewart reasoned the prohibition of stacking was contrary 
to the intent of the legislature. 167 
Justice Stewart noted that the inequity of prohibiting stacking in this 
instance "has led a large majority of courts to allow insureds to 'stack' two 
or more coverages," in spite of clear and unambiguous policy language 
prohibiting stacking. 168 Given the large body of case law holding anti-
stacking provisions unconscionable, it is perplexing that the majority did 
not at least address this argument, especially in light of the majority's rea-
soning that "case-by-case development of Utah's traditional equitable rem-
edies suffices to protect against overreaching insurers."169 
2. Ambiguity: Goetz v. American Reliable Insurance Co. 
The Utah Court of Appeals addressed the applicability of the principle 
that ambiguities must be construed against the drafter of the contract in 
162. Id. at 668-69. 
163. /d. 
164. See Allen v. Prudential Property & Cas. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 805 (Utah 1992). 
165. Neilsen, 848 P.2d at 670-71. 
166. /d. 
167. See id. at 673. 
168. /d. at 671-73 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citing cases that permit stacking under similar 
circumstances in multiple jurisdictions in the country). 
169. /d. at 667. 
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Goetz v. American Reliable Insurance Co. 170 Adam Goetz collided with a 
moose while driving the vehicle of a friend. 171 Goetz collected the $3,000 
maximum no fault benefits under the insurance policy covering his 
friend's vehicle, and thereafter sought to collect the no fault benefits under 
his own auto insurance policy with American Reliable. 172 American Reli-
able denied coverage, claiming the policy exclusion under the "other insur-
ance" portion of its policy applied. 173 Goetz thereafter brought suit, claim-
ing, inter alia, that the provisions prohibiting stacking of no fault benefits 
were ambiguous and therefore must be construed against the insurer and in 
favor of coverage, 174 and that the exclusion violated his reasonable expec-
tations.175 
Goetz's reasonable expectations arguments were quickly dismissed in 
light of Allen. 116 His ambiguity argument, however, received a detailed 
analysis. Although the court held there were ambiguities in the "other 
insurance" clause which could reasonably be construed as permitting the 
coverage Goetz sought, the court held this ambiguity was irrelevant when 
the clause was read as a whole. 177 The court gave a lengthy and detailed 
analysis of the three paragraph "other insurance" clause, and concluded 
that while other ambiguities may exist, such ambiguities were irrelevant 
since they did not specifically apply to Goetz's peculiar factual situation. 178 
The effect, if any, of the Allen court's holdings is unclear from the 
Goetz decision; however, it seems clear the Court of Appeals did not fol-
low the Utah Supreme Court's affirmation in Allen and reaffirmation in 
Nielsen to further develop equitable doctrines to provide protection for 
insured persons. A reading of Goetz shows the Court of Appeals did not 
read the clause at issue as the average, reasonable purchaser of insurance, 
170. 844 P.2d 366 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
171. See id. at 367. 
172. See id. 
173. !d. at 368-69. The "other insurance" provision provided as follows: 
[I] No eligible injured person shall recover duplicate benefits for the same elements 
of loss under this or any similar insurance. 
[2) If an eligible injured person who is a named insured, a relative. or person who 
is injured in an accident involving the use of an insured motor vehicle, has other similar 
insurance applicable to the accident, the maximum recovery under all such insurance shall 
not exceed the amount which would have been payable under the provisions of the 
insurance providing the highest dollar limit. We shall not be liable for a greater proportion 
of any Joss to which this coverage applies than the limit of liability hereunder bears to 
the sum of the applicable limits of liability of this coverage and such other insurance. 
[3) If an eligible insured is also an insured under any other policy, primary coverage 
is given by the policy insuring the motor vehicle in use during the accident. 
!d. at 367-68. 
174. See id. at 368. 
175. See id. at 371. 
176. See id. 
177. /d. at 369-70. 
178. !d. at 370. 
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as traditionally required under the doctrine of ambiguity. 179 This is evident 
from the fact that the court was required to dissect each section of the three 
paragraph clause and explain its meaning to support its interpretation. 180 
Moreover, the fact that the court was willing to dismiss ambiguities that 
supported coverage because other admittedly cloudy clauses could be read 
as denying coverage indicates a very narrow application of the doctrine. 
While a close reading of the "other insurance" clause does support the 
Court of Appeal's decision, it is the court's analysis, and not its holding, 
which is most troublesome. Rather than further developing this "undevel-
oped" equitable doctrine as suggested by the Allen majority, 181 the Court of 
Appeals' analysis is a direction toward a more limited application of the 
ambiguity doctrine where the understanding of an appellate court judge is 
substituted for the reasonable understanding of the consumer. 
V. RETHINKING THE INTERSTITIAL APPROACH AS A SAFEGUARD AGAINST 
OVERREACHING INSURERS 
A. The Future of the Interstitial Approach of Allen as Adequate 
Protection for the Insured 
Again, the analysis of the above two decisions, and not the conclu-
sions, is what proves to be most troubling about the future of the interstitial 
approach as the method of protection in Utah against an insurer's potential 
overreaching. As in Allen, 182 the Nielsen majority only rejects the reason-
able expectations doctrine and thereafter neglects to discuss the application 
of the "other" equitable doctrines which are purportedly adequate protec-
tion for the insured. And in Goetz, rather than adhering to the Utah Su-
preme Court's affirmations of the courts' duty to "further develop" equita-
ble doctrines to protect the insured, the court applied a more restricted ver-
sion of the ambiguity doctrine. Moreover, as noted above, no decision 
which has cited to Allen and the majority's interstitial approach has been 
decided in favor of the insured. 183 Only Justices Stewart and Durham, who 
both disagreed with the Allen majority's rejection of the reasonable expec-
tations doctrine, have attempted to offer an insured protection under the 
majority's interstitial approach when a case cites to Allen. 184 
The inevitable conclusion appears to be that Utah courts are not able 
to apply equitable doctrines in favor of insured parties in the face of the 
179. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 523 (Utah 1993) ("[T]he 
policy must be construed in light of how the average, reasonable purchaser of insurance would 
understand the language of the policy as a whole."). 
180. See Goetz, 844 P.2d at 370-71. 
181. Allen v. Prudential Property & Cas. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 805-06 (Utah 1992). 
182. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
183. See supra note 153. 
184. See supra Part IV.B.l. 
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majority's contradictory reasoning in Allen. The court's strong statements 
that judicial review of policy provisions is inappropriate "absent legislative 
direction"185 seems to overshadow the court's weaker affirmation of a duty 
to further apply and develop the common law for the protection of the in-
sured.186 To the contrary, the above analysis supports the conclusion that 
an insured person who cites to the interstitial approach of Allen while seek-
ing to invoke insurance law rights for his protection is less likely to have 
those rights honored than if he avoided any reference to Allen's interstitial 
approach or the reasonable expectations doctrine. 187 
B. Affirming the Judicial Duty to Review Insurance Contracts 
Arguably, this retreat from applying equitable doctrines to insurance 
form contracts is not the result intended by the Allen majority. Certainly 
this result runs contrary to the legislative policy of the Insurance Code "to 
ensure that policyholder, claimants, and insurers are treated fairly and equi-
tably."188 However, even if the courts were to attempt a more active appli-
cation of Allen's interstitial approach, this direction likely leads down a 
path of painful litigation, exploring the yet unexplored areas of Utah's "un-
developed" equitable doctrines in an effort to prove that Utah courts can 
do what a majority of other courts and commentators have conceded can-
not be done: achieve fairness to both parties in today' s world of form con-
tracts without unduly distorting yesterday's equitable doctrines. It seems 
unlikely that this path of the unknown can afford better predictability for 
either the insurers or the insured than the reasonable expectations doctrine. 
But even if theoretically Utah courts could further develop the avail-
able equitable doctrines without unduly distorting them in an effort to 
achieve fairness, the review of cases citing to Allen's interstitial approach 
demonstrates that the Utah Supreme Court needs to clarify that courts may 
appropriately review insurance contracts to realize the statutorily expressed 
policy of equity and fairness to both parties. Rather than attempt to walk 
the fine line between the two inconsistent arguments relied on by the Allen 
185. Nielsen v. O'Reilly, 848 P.2d 665, 668 (Utah 1992). 
186. See id. 
187. For cases that do not cite Allen, but do invoke insurance law rights for the protection of 
the insured, st'.e United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519 (Utah 1993) (construing 
ambiguous policy provision in favor of coverage for the insured); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Kearl, 896 
P.2d 644 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (reversing trial court's grant of summary judgment where material 
issue of fact existed on whether facts were sufficient to support elements of estoppel); Andreasen 
v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 848 P.2d 171 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (affirming jury award of damages 
ba~ed on estoppel); van der Heyde v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 845 P.2d 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
(reversing trial court's grant of summary judgment where material issue of fact existed on whether 
facts were sufficient to support elements of estoppel). 
188. Allen v. Prudential Property & Cas. Co., 839 P.2d 798. 812 (Utah 1992) (Stewart, J., 
concurring) (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-I-102(2) (1991)). 
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majority, the court should affirmatively embrace its duty of reviewing in-
surance contracts for fairness to the parties by formally adopting the rea-
sonable expectations doctrine. 
While protection of the freedom of contract, or (in this context) the 
right of an insurer to insert clauses into the policy as he chooses, remains a 
legitimate legislative policy, it is clear that this is not an unqualified right. 
Indeed, the history of heavy regulation of the insurance industry by all 
three traditional branches of government is ample evidence that this right 
in the insurance industry has been limited. However, since the reasonable 
expectations doctrine looks for the true intent of the parties while simulta-
neously seeking fairness to both parties, this doctrine supports and bal-
ances both legislative goals of fairness and preserving the freedom of con-
tract.189 
Since Professor Keeton's early recognition of the reasonable expecta-
tions doctrine, few courts have had as much experience as the Arizona 
courts in applying the doctrine.190 The Arizona decisions, therefore, can 
provide meaningful guidance to Utah's application of the reasonable ex-
pectations doctrine. Rather than start from ground zero, Utah can seek to 
build on the experience of the Arizona courts and thereby minimize con-
cerns of uncertainty in the application of the doctrine. The Arizona Su-
preme Court has summarized when the reasonable expectations doctrine 
will grant the insured rights at variance with provisions, even where the 
provision is unambiguous: 
1. Where the contract terms, although not ambiguous to 
the court, cannot be understood by the reasonably intelligent 
consumer who might check on his or her rights, the court will 
interpret them in light of the objective, reasonable expecta-
tions of the average insured; 
2. Where the insured did not receive full and adequate 
notice of the term in question, and the provision is either un-
usual or unexpected, or one that emasculates apparent cover-
age; 
3. Where some activity which can be reasonably attributed 
to the insurer would create an objective impression of coverage 
in the mind of a reasonable insured; 
4. Where some activity reasonably attributable to the in-
surer has induced a particular insured reasonably to believe 
189. See supra Part IV.A.3. 
190. See Henderson, supra note 3, at 842-52 (summarizing Arizona's history and law on the 
reasonable expectations doctrine). 
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that he has coverage, although such coverage is expressly and 
unambiguously denied by the policy .... 191 
Any potential uncertainties which may remain to be answered from 
Arizona's case law should be left, as the Allen majority said of the devel-
opment of the interstitial approach, for development on a "case-by-case" 
basis, 192 building on what the Arizona courts have established. While these 
potential uncertainties may invoke criticism, it is worth noting that con-
cerns for far reaching and broad decisions having unknown impacts on the 
insurance industry seem particularly unlikely, given both the conservative 
application of the doctrine in general193 and Utah's especially conservative 
application of Allen's interstitial approach. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The reasonable expectations doctrine, which has as its driving policy a 
concern for equity and fairness to both parties, is likely to continue to be 
adopted on a large scale in the majority of jurisdictions. The Utah Supreme 
Court's rejection of the reasonable expectations doctrine failed to consider 
the most recent statutes of the Insurance Code, failed to consider the Rules 
of the Insurance Commissioner, failed to be consistent in its reasoning, and 
failed to give adequate consideration for the legislatively expressed policy 
of equity and fairness to both parties. More significantly, the inconsistent 
reasoning of Allen has caused courts to abstain from applying equitable 
doctrines to insurance contracts, leaving the final review for fairness and 
equity largely to the discretion of the drafters of insurance contracts. Utah 
should abandon the "interstitial" approach of Allen in favor of the reason-
able expectations doctrine in order to take an affirmative stand that Utah 
courts will apply principles of equity and fairness, and not just that of 
maintaining the freedom of contract. 194 In that regard, the experience of the 
courts of Arizona with the reasonable expectations doctrine can serve as 
guidance to Utah courts in seeking to apply the reasonable expectations 
doctrine. 
Mark T. Flickinger 
191. Avarett v. Fanners Ins. Co. of Arizona, 869 P.2d 505, 507 (Ariz. 1994). 
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